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In this paper we focus on the relationship between remittance inflows and financial 
inclusion in developing countries. We present single equation estimates on remittances 
and financial inclusion, and system estimates in which economic growth is explained by 
e.g., financial inclusion, and financial inclusion by, e.g., remittances inflows. These 
regressions clearly confirm our main hypothesis that remittances have a development 
impact through their effect on financial inclusion. Overall, our paper indicates the 
importance of studying the effects of remittances in developing countries. Remittances, 
in terms of size, are not only one of the main capital inflows in developing countries, 
often even more substantial than ODA, but they also appear to have a robust positive 
effect on economic growth. 
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Each year millions of migrants send money earned abroad back to their country of 
origin. They participate in globalization by engaging in arbitrage in international labour 
markets, creating family bonds and obligations across countries. The development 
impact of migration and the ensuing international remittance flow have become 
increasingly the subject of research and policy discussions, once the vast scale of 
international ‘people and money flows’ became apparent. It is no longer uncommon for 
remittance inflows to constitute between 5-10 per cent of total GDP in (small) 
developing countries (World Bank 2005b). Remittance inflows surpass official 
development flows in middle-income countries, and foreign direct investment in low-
income countries. For 2005, the World Bank estimates the total flows to equal US$250 
billion (including informal flows). This trend is unlikely to reverse in the medium to 
long term. Migration is expected to continue and costs of remitting are falling, 
providing a lower threshold for migration. The World Bank (2005c: 92-3) expects that 
remittance flows will continue to grow at an annual rate of 7-8 per cent, similar to the 
growth rates of the 1990s (ibid).  
The effects of this large-scale movement of capital are many, both positive and negative 
(for a full discussion, see World Bank 2005c: 99-105). On the downside, a large inflow 
of remittances may lead to currency appreciation, thereby lowering competitiveness of 
export products (World Bank 2005c: 104). Some also argue that the work effort of 
remittance recipients may decrease, thus dampening growth (Chami, Fullenkamp and 
Jahjah 2005). On the positive side, remittance inflows increase capital availability for 
consumption in the receiving countries, and can create in the local economies multiplier 
effects on GDP, job creation, consumption, income and investment (Stahl and Arnold 
1986; De Vasconcelos 2005). Remittances also supply foreign exchange, 
complementing national savings and providing funding for investment, notably for 
small-scale projects, hence providing finance for output growth (Solimano 2003). 
Bugamelli and Paternò (viewed on multiple occasions) (2005) show that a large flow of 
remittances into a country can help reduce the probability of current account reversals, 
and thus lower the chance of a financial crisis. Furthermore, remittances are a person-to-
person flow of money without government intervention, often delivered directly to the 
lower-income segment of a country. They can therefore stimulate development without 
increasing debt or administrative burden. Remittances are also supposed to improve 
financial inclusion by providing affordable financial services within the formal financial 
system to those who tend to be excluded. Remittances may therefore play a crucial role 
in the wider issue of access to finance. 
There is now ample evidence that financial development in general, and banking 
development in particular, has a positive effect on economic growth (see, e.g., Levine 
2003). However, while available literature suggests that remittances may stimulate 
economic growth, for example, through improved financial inclusion, there is a lack of 
empirical studies to confirm this hypothesis. In this paper, we take up the challenge to 
empirically assess the impact of remittance inflows on financial inclusion. More 
specifically, this paper is the first to demonstrate the effect of remittance inflows on 
financial access and usage for a cross-country group of developing countries. We also 
provide new empirical evidence on the growth effects of remittances to developing 
countries through improvement of financial inclusion.  2 
This paper continues as follows. In the next section we describe trends in remittance 
flows. Next, we present arguments for a causal effect of remittance inflow on financial 
inclusion, followed by preliminary evidence of this relationship. In section 4 we discuss 
the sampling and research design of the methodology. This is followed in section 5 by 
the data analysis. The paper concludes with a summary and some recommendations. 
2  Trends in remittances 
The importance of workers’ remittances is clearly shown by Figure 1. This figure 
indicates that since 1997, remittance flows to the entire group of developing countries 
surpass the inflow of official development assistance (ODA). However, foreign direct 
investments (FDI) are still the most important inflow for the entire group of developing 
countries. The same holds for such country groups as the upper middle-income 
countries (Figure 2), the lower middle-income countries (Figure 3) and the regions of 
East Asia and the Pacific (Figure 5), Latin America (Figure 6), and Europe and Central 
Asia (Figure 7). 
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In the low-income countries (Figure 4), remittances even now constitute the most 
important inflow, with ODA second in magnitude. The same pattern can be observed in 
the Middle East (Figure 8) and South Asia (Figure 9). In Sub-Saharan Africa, ODA 
flows dwarf both FDI and workers’ remittances (Figure 10) and remittances are the least 
important inflow only in this region, but even here there is a steady increase. 
The accuracy of the data presented above may vary among regions. There is 
considerable variation in how remittances are transferred through formal or informal 
channels, a fact which affects whether or not flows are recorded (for an overview of the 
players in the remittance market, see Orozco 2004). The Global Economic Prospects 
report 2006 (World Bank 2005c) provides an overview of the different channels used 
for remittances at the country level. This varies from formal channels being used in the 
Dominican Republic in 96 per cent of the cases to just 20 per cent in Uganda (World 
Bank 2005c: 91, based on World Bank household surveys). In Sub-Saharan Africa, for 
example, the use of informal channels is more widespread, and thus is not well recorded 
(Sander 2003: 3-4). The current state of data on remittances is disadvantaged by this 
large variation in the channels used, and should be kept in mind.  
By matching migration patterns worldwide, Harrison, Birrton and Swanson (2003) 
estimate the size of remittance flows for each continent and for selected countries 
(origin and destination) for the year 2000.1 Table 1 shows the aggregate per continent. 
Remittances flows from North America to Latin America and the Caribbean are large at 
US$14.2 billion, but remittance flows between Asian countries are twice that size, 
displaying a large south-south remittance flow in Asia (within-Asia flows are US$29.3 
billion if Japan is excluded). Remittance flows within Africa are estimated to be larger 
than those from both Europe and Asia. Other large magnitudes are directed from North 
America to Asia and within Europe.  
Table 1 
Size of remittance flows between continents (2000) 
  Remittances going to:       
 Africa  Asia  Europe  LAC  North  America Oceania  Total (a 
Remittances coming from:             
            
Africa 3.7  0.5  0.1 0.0  0.0  0.0 4.2 
Asia 3.4  31.5  3.4  0.5 0.2  0.0  39.0 
Europe 2.6  3.2  9.5 (b 0.4  0.4  0.1  16.2 
Latin America/Caribbean   0.1  0.6  1.1 0.1    1.8 
North America  0.7  7.9  5.7 14.2  0.9  0.1 29.6 
Oceania  0  0.2 0.4    0  0.1 0.8 
 10.4  43.4  19.6  16.2 1.6  0.3  91.5 
Notes:  (a  Totals may differ slightly in own calculations due to rounding. 
  (b  US$24.1 million for European border-workers excluded. 
Source:  Harrison, Britton and Swanson (2003). 
                                                 
1  The data by Harrison, Britton and Swanson (2003) are not an exact match to the year 2000 data by the 
World Bank (2005b). Although categorized somewhat differently, Latin America-Caribbean flows 
reported here are smaller, while European and Asian flows larger. Although both sets are based on the 
IMF balance-of-payment statistics, they have been augmented with the authors’ own estimates for 
missing or badly recorded flows. This difference is a good indication of the need for improvements in 
remittance data.  5 
When we look more closely at the flows within regions, they are not evenly distributed 
among countries. Table 2 gives more detail by listing all remittance flows in 2000 that 
exceeded US$300 million (Harrison, Birron and Swanson 2003). The flow from the US 
to Mexico is overwhelmingly the largest, accounting for about half of all flows to LAC 
countries. The table also shows that remittance flows within Asia originate largely in 
Saudi Arabia, with Japan in second place. More than half of the Europe-to-Asia flows 
occur within the Germany-Turkey corridor. Although the largest flows are to 
developing countries, some developed countries also receive considerable amounts of 
remittances (Canada, Germany, UK and Italy). The sending countries are all developed 
OECD countries, with the exception of Saudi Arabia (developed, but not OECD). 
Despite these large flows originating in the developed countries, about 30 per cent of all 
remittance flows are ‘south-south’ flows (if Saudi Arabia were classified as a 
developing country, this would raise south-south remittances to 45 per cent, World 
Bank 2005c: 111).  
Table 2 
Largest remittance corridors in 2000 in decreasing order 
From To  Amount  (US$  million) 
    
United States  Mexico  7,612.5 
Saudi Arabia  India  3,609.7 
Saudi Arabia  Pakistan  1,804.9 
Saudi Arabia  Philippines  1.582.7 
Saudi Arabia  Egypt  1,388.4 
United States  China  1,350.5 
Germany Turkey  1,195.2 
United States  Philippines 1,186.4 
Japan Korea  1,012.1 
United States  India  977.7 
Saudi Arabia  Indonesia  971.8 
United States   Vietnam  837.9 
Saudi Arabia  Bangladesh  694.2 
France Portugal  659.2 
United States  Canada  658.2 
United States  Germany  634.0 
France Morocco  600.1 
United States  United Kingdom  595.1 
France Algeria  568.5 
Japan China  534.6 
Switzerland Italy  448.4 
United States  Italy  437.9 
United States  Poland  432.0 
United States  Colombia  422.3 
Japan Brazil  405.3 
Germany Italy  370.2 
United States  Russia  353.4 
Source:  Harrison, Britton and Swanson (2003). 6 
It is often claimed that remittance flows are more stable than other capital inflows. 
Using the World Development Indicators (WDI) 2005 (World Bank 2005b) for 
developed countries as a whole, we calculate and compare the volatility of remittance 
flows, ODA and FDI over the period 1979-2003, measuring volatility in two ways. One 
is the coefficient of variation, calculated as the standard deviation divided by the mean 
(times 100). The coefficients of variation of the three capital flows indicate that the least 
volatile flow is ODA, followed by remittances, with FDI being the most volatile 
(Table 3).  
This variable, however, does not take into account increasing trends in the data. Since 
FDI and remittances show an increasing trend during this period, we also want to 
measure volatility with a linear-trend assumption for each of the three capital flows. A 
steady increase in both remittances and FDI is therefore not included as part of 
volatility. We measure the best-fit trend line for the three capital flows, by regressing 
them individually against the period measured (per year), including a constant in the 
regression. We then calculate the standard deviation of the residuals of each regression 
as a measure of volatility (the square root of the sum of the squared residuals). 
Qualitatively this measure yields similar results as the coefficient of variation: ODA is 
the least volatile flow followed by remittances and FDI.  
Table 3 
Measures of volatility for FDI, ODA and remittances 
 FDI  ODA  Remittances 
     
Coefficient of variation  95  32  65 
Std dev. of residuals of a linear regression line  1.4E+11  3.7E+10  4.7E+10 
Source:   Own calculation based on data from World Bank (2005b). 
3  The effect of remittances on financial inclusion 
In this section we explore the exact channels in which changes that may cause 
remittances to increase financial inclusion are taking place. We look at demand, supply 
and policy factors, also applying the access frontier theory to financial markets in the 
developing countries. 
3.1 Demand  factors 
Remittance senders, by definition, need at least one financial service: one that offers 
international payments. This demand can be an incentive for turning towards the 
banking sector or other financial institutions as a supplier. At the other end of the 
transaction, the need to receive remittances may induce people to look for the first time 
for financial services beyond their neighbourhood. The World Bank (2005c) notes that 
‘in contrast to cash transactions, remittances channelled through bank accounts may 
encourage savings and enable a better match for savings and investment in the 
economy’. Thus for many, migration and subsequent sending of remittance can be the 
first personal interaction with the global economy.  7 
The migrant sending the remittances induces the recipient to contact the institution 
through which the money is being transmitted. If this institution is a bank offering 
supplementary financial products (compared to a money transfer organization or 
informal channel that offers remittance-sending services only), this interaction can 
create a demand for products such as savings, credit, mortgages and insurance. In this 
manner, the increased financial awareness of the migrant can be the driving force for 
increased literacy at the receiving end. Estimates show that around 10 per cent of 
remittance receipts are saved, invested, and used for entrepreneurial activity (Orozco 
and Fedewa 2005: 4). The fact that some cash inflow is invested indicates that a demand 
for complementary financial products does exist among remittance receivers. 
Some remittances are sent in-kind, in order to stipulate the use of the remitted ‘capital’. 
This implies that there is a certain need on the sender’s side to influence the use of their 
money (i.e., sending an airline ticket or vouchers). Linking other financial products, 
such as different payout options or mortgages, to the remitted amount is a service that is 
already at times requested by customers. Increasing the possibilities in this manner for 
formal money transfer services could be a response to the existing demand (Sander and 
Maimbo 2005: 68).  
3.2 Supply  factors 
A wide array of institutions exists to respond to the vast demand for remittance-sending 
services. In addition to many informal channels and the money transfer organizations 
that capture a large share of the market, other more diversified and formal financial 
institutions also offer similar services. Commercial banks, recognizing the vast size of 
remittance flows2 however small individual amounts may be, are increasingly interested 
in targeting this new market segment. Besides capturing money flows, the remittance 
channel can be used to sell financial service-packages geared towards low-income 
individuals. Hernández-Coss (2005) states that ‘by developing formal remittance 
channels that are competitive with informal ones, the formal financial sector has an 
incentive to develop and benefit from the overall opportunity to grow and expand 
through the remittance market’.  Credit unions worldwide have also focussed on 
remittances and have collectively created a remittance service (IRnet) for sending 
money electronically. In the process, they offer other financial services to these users 
such as savings accounts (see Grace 2005).  
The perceived benefits of serving the low-income market have increased as a result of 
the demand by the poorer people for remittance services and the ensuing constant 
inflow of money. Regular remittances can reduce informational problems because the 
continual inflow of money from abroad allows the lower-income segment of the 
population to build a sound financial history with a financial institution. The earned 
income now needs some form of intermediation in order to transfer it to destination. 
Banks can cross-sell to obtain new clients and enable them to build a financial history 
by offering international transfer services together with complementary services, such 
as savings or checking accounts. Through the remittance inflow, the bank gets an 
insight into the client’s income and expected future funds, thus indicating the potential 
                                                 
2   Harris (2002) estimates that the average annual amount per sender is in the range of US$700-1,000 
(quoted in Orozco 2003). 8 
creditworthiness of the recipient, since a constant (future) inflow can repay loans. In 
addition, as adverse circumstances at home generally increase remittances from 
abroad,3 this can potentially lower a client’s risk profile. Banks thus obtain information 
about prospective loan clients, reducing the problem of adverse selection. Furthermore, 
remittances are a relatively risk-free way of establishing contact with new clientele.4 
The bank can use this knowledge to base greater emphasis in its client analysis on ‘soft’ 
data, such as reliability and character of the firm’s owner. 
The argument is similar for remittance inflows as a marketable collateral. Remittance 
inflows have not only an informational function, but also convey direct value to the 
bank. When remittances go through a bank, clients can use both current and future 
inflows as ‘collateral’. If the inflows are accepted by a bank as such, loans could be 
(partly) covered by remittance inflows, thus lowering the bank’s risk, and motivating 
payback and optimal project management.  
Finally, the direct income effect of remittances may affect supply. When a family 
member decides to migrate, he/she would, rationally speaking, do so only if the 
expected benefit from working abroad minus the extra costs of sustaining oneself 
abroad were larger than the family income before migration. Therefore, receiving 
families will in general move to a higher-income client group that is more attractive for 
the bank and may thus boost the supply of financial services for this group.  
3.3  The access frontier 
The access frontier can be applied to examine the relationship between remittance 
inflows and financial inclusion from a different angle. This method combines demand 
and supply arguments and is used by Porteous (2004) to look at how a financial market 
can ‘work for the poor’. The access frontier can be defined as the maximum usage 
possible under existing structural conditions of technology, infrastructure and regulation 
(Porteous 2004: 8). He argues that the access frontier expands outward until market 
development moves into a saturation and consolidation phase, where the market reaches 
a natural limit. Usage is at its maximum, and non-usage becomes a genuine choice, 
unhindered by income or supply constraints. Porteous investigates why the access 
frontier in developing countries is not yet at its maximum (natural limit).  
We take the example of South Africa, cited by Porteous, to demonstrate how remittance 
inflows can move the access frontier outwards. In South Africa, 48 per cent of adults 
have a bank account. The two most frequently cited reasons for not having a bank 
account are the lack of either a regular income (35.6 per cent) or a job (59.8 per cent). 
According to the third most common reason, earnings are too scant to make it 
worthwhile (11.4 per cent). One to 6 per cent of people cite reasons such as having no 
identity documentation, not qualifying for an account or not wanting to keep a minimum 
balance nor pay service fees.  
The regular inflow of remittances may move the access frontier outwards by eliminating 
the reasons for non-usage. Remittance inflows can function as a substitution for a job or 
                                                 
3   For evidence on countercyclicality of remittance flows, see World Bank (2005c: 99-100). 
4   See Berger and Udell (2002) on relationship lending. 9 
regular income. Since remittances in most cases are sent to sustain a family, the inflow 
is often regular, making it comparable to ‘regular income’. Also, when a family member 
migrates, family earnings tend to increase, thereby reducing the income-effect problems 
of having a bank account. These make the recipients of remittances interesting clients 
for banks. If the obstacles to banking, whether demand or supply-led, are removed, the 
receipt of international remittances may trigger an outward move of the access frontier. 
Recipients become potential bank clients, and they themselves will also have greater 
need to use banking services.  
The effects mentioned above will depend on the ability and willingness of banks to 
adapt. If banks are interested in remittance inflows from abroad, their product packages 
should be expanded accordingly, by offering, for example, low cost or free international 
transactions for clients who have a bank account with them. However, as Prahalad 
(2005: 8) notes, a dominant logic applies to private-sector businesses that may restrict 
their ability to see a dynamic and viable market opportunity at the ‘bottom of the 
pyramid’. On the demand side, inadequate regulation and mistrust of banks can hinder 
the development of financial access considerably. Adequate government regulation and 
policy in this area will also play a role. These are discussed next.  
3.4  Policy and regulatory issues 
Through policy geared at integrating remittance senders into the formal economy, 
governments can create a more inclusive financial sector and a more efficient and 
formal economy. They can increase the financial depth of the economy and improve the 
monitoring of financial flows. Governments can influence access to formal financial 
services in a country by stimulating remittance sending through formal channels. This 
puts migrants and remittance recipients in touch with diversified financial institutions, 
and can lead to increased demand and supply of other financial products.   
Governments can encourage transfers through formal channels by removing taxes on 
incoming remittances, relaxing exchange and capital controls, allowing domestic banks 
to operate overseas, providing ID cards for migrants, supporting hometown associations 
and providing matching grants, offering loan/pension schemes and bonds targeted at the 
diasporas, and by actively supporting the diaspora to help ensure the welfare of their 
citizens abroad (World Bank 2005c: 95). Also, educating the population on the benefits 
and processes of financial institutions can increase demand for formal financial services 
(World Bank 2003b). These measures make it more attractive for diversified financial 
institutions to enter the remittance market, and for the clientele to send money through 
formal channels. Two regulatory issues in moving towards formal channels need, 
however, to be highlighted: identification requirements for migrants and regulation on 
money laundering and terrorist financing.  
Valid immigration status is often a problem in using formal channels to remit funds. 
Migrants without legal status lack adequate identification for opening bank accounts 
abroad or using the banking system to transfer funds. Surveys of migrants in Los 
Angeles and New York show that they are discouraged from opening bank accounts by 
the minimum balance requirements and strict identification regulations (Ratha 2003: 
35). In these cases, migrants tend to resort to money transfer organizations or informal 
networks. With alternative, acceptable forms of identification for opening bank 
accounts, more migrants are able to participate in the formal banking system and use 10 
this channel to transfer money abroad. The most prominent example of this measure is 
the ‘matrícula consular’ issued to Mexican migrants at consulates in the US 
(Hernández-Coss 2005: 12). As private banks become more interested in the remittance 
market, they will increasingly start to accept identification other than those based on 
legal immigrant status. Much, however, depends on the immigration policy of the 
country. For security reasons, some authorities may disagree with this alternative form 
of identification, an issue related to the next topic.  
Another factor driving the formalization of international capital flows is the increased 
regulations on money laundering and financing terrorist activities which received a 
boost after September 11th. The US Patriot Act stipulates that banks and other financial 
institutions should endeavour to ‘know their customers’, or to be able to identify and 
monitor everyone depositing or transferring money through them (de Vasconcelos 
2005). The small remittance organizations in the US that maintained bank accounts 
where money was pooled from various individual sources for transfers abroad have 
discontinued these accounts because under the new regulation banks considered it too 
risky. This policy has almost certainly led to an increased demand for formal banking 
channels for remittances, particularly in those countries where measured inflows have 
doubled or even tripled between 2001 and 2003 (World Bank 2005c: 91).  
3.5  Preliminary evidence for a causal relationship  
Currently, the Inter-American Development Bank (2005) estimates that less than 10 per 
cent of remittance receivers have access to basic banking services, although this 
estimate varies widely among countries. Countries with a long migrant tradition, such as 
Portugal, Turkey and the Philippines, have developed financial institutions geared 
towards migrant populations, with banks capturing a large proportion of remittances. 
When people become bank clients at the receiving end, this affects the number of 
individuals who are bank clients in the home country, including returning migrants. 
Portuguese banks, for example, have developed full banking services in France, 
Germany and other emigrant destinations, thus encouraging emigrants to have bank 
accounts and use banking services (Orozco 2002: 14-5). The Turkish remittance market 
consists mostly of Turkish banks with efficient systems for transferring money to 
accounts maintained with headoffices in the homecountry (Orozco 2002: 17). In the 
Philippines, banks have about 71 per cent share of the remittance market (Philippines 
Census Bureau, quoted in Orozco 2002: 16). According to Orozco and Fedewa (2005), 
remittance recipients in selected Latin American countries are more likely to be banking 
individuals than non-recipients (Table 4).  
The experience of credit unions affiliated with the World Council of Credit Unions 
(WOCCU) shows that on average 14 to 28 per cent of the non-members who   
 
Table 4 
Percentage of population with bank accounts (remittance recipients and non-recipients)  
Year 2003  Guatemala  Honduras  El Salvador  Mexico  Ecuador 
       
Recipients  41% 34% 31% 19%  46% 
Non-recipients  17% 16% 19% 16%  34% 
Source:   Orozco and Fedewa (2005). 11 
approach these institutions requesting transfer services through their IR network end up 
opening an account (Maimbo and Ratha 2005: 9). Generally, credit unions are well 
equipped to serve the previously non-banking remittance senders and receivers because 
of their good rural locations (Maimbo and Ratha 2005: 10). 
3.6  Other factors affecting financial inclusion 
The recent research paper by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Martinez Peria (2005) presents 
new indicators of banking sector penetration for 99 countries, both on access and use, 
and shows the correlation between data on access to finance and other variables at a 
cross-country level, using various proxies for branch penetration, ATM penetration, 
number of loans and deposits.  
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Martinez Peria (2005) observe a correlation between banking 
outreach and economic size, and with population density. More densely populated areas 
have a higher bank branch and ATM penetration; the relevance of the economic size of 
a country suggests that economies of scale play a role in banking services. Financial 
outreach, like financial development, is positively correlated with institutional quality. 
Effective credit information sharing also shows a correlation with increased banking 
penetration (outlets), though not necessarily with the number of loans.  
The variable restrictions on bank activities is correlated negatively with branch 
penetration. The share of assets held by government-owned banks has a negative 
correlation with demographic branch and ATM penetration. The concentration ratio is 
positively associated with branch and ATM penetration and with deposit taking. Finally, 
the  communication and transportation infrastructure indicators have a positive 
correlation with all indicators used for access to and use of banking services. One more 
variable added in this discussion is average income level, to control for the possibility 
that a higher level of development does not influence the results.  
4 Research  design 
As mentioned in the introduction, we focus on the impact of remittances on financial 
inclusion in developing countries. The set of developing countries included in the 
sample is based on data availability. The variable with the poorest availability for 
developing countries is financial inclusion. Consequently, selection of the sample 
countries is almost entirely based on the data availability of this (dependent) variable. A 
few countries were later deleted due to lack of remittance data, the main independent 
variable in the analysis.  
One pitfall in using a sample based on data availability is that countries with a failing or 
unorganized government may be underrepresented because of poor administrative 
systems. This would bias the sample towards developing countries with ‘better’ 
governments, thus possibly the higher-income developing countries. Comparing the 
sample to the country population indicated that there is, indeed, a slight 
underrepresentation of low-income countries (only 24 per cent of the low-income 
countries are included) and an overrepresentation of lower middle-income and upper 
middle-income countries (54 per cent and 50 per cent, respectively). The total sample 12 
consists of 41 per cent of all nations classified as developing countries according to the 
World Bank Atlas Classification (2005d). 
The regional representation of developing countries also varies; only 21 per cent of  
Sub-Saharan African developing countries are represented as opposed to 70 per cent of 
those in European and Central Asia. Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East-North Africa, and 
East Asia-Pacific regions are underrepresented, whereas Europe and Central Asia, Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and South Asia are overrepresented (Table 5).   
Table 5 
Regional representation in sample 
  No. of countries in:   
Region  The sample  This region   
Proportion of 
countries in sample 
        
Europe and Central Asia  19  27    0.704 
Latin America and Caribbean  19  32    0.594 
Sub-Saharan Africa  10  48    0.208 
South Asia   5  8    0.625 
East Asia and Pacific  7  24    0.292 
Middle East and North Africa  4  14    0.286 
TOTAL 64  153    0.418 
Source:   Author’s calculations using World Bank Atlas Classification (World Bank 2005d). 
4.1  Data collection  
Data on remittance flows are expected to systematically underreport real flows due to 
lack of information on flows through informal channels and inaccurate reporting by 
government bodies. Estimates on informal flows vary widely, between 50-250 per cent 
of recorded flows (Freund and Spatafora 2005: 2). Thus, for a comparative analysis it is 
difficult to use data that include estimates of informal flows.5 A project on remittances 
data led by the World Bank, IMF and the UN is currently underway to clearly define 
remittances and incorporate their measurement into worldwide household surveys 
(Hovinga 2005). To optimize the estimates of remittance flows, we are making a 
compromise between using a dataset that is most complete and most accurate. The 
balance-of-payments statistics of the IMF are the most commonly used data in this 
respect, and three categories are often compiled (see also Reinke and Patterson 2005): 
i)  Workers’ remittances (credit); transfers by migrants living abroad for longer 
than one year; 
ii)  Employee compensation (credit); transfers by migrants abroad for less than 
one year; 
iii)  Migrant transfers (credit); money that migrants take back home when they 
return indefinitely.  
                                                 
5   For methods on measuring informal remittances, see also Hernández-Coss (2005) and World Bank 
(2003a). 13 
The first two are the most relevant for financial transfer services, since these flows are 
transmitted by means other than personal delivery. However, the distinction between 
these three categories is sometimes blurred in individual country reports to IMF. Some 
countries report the aggregate of all three categories under either worker remittances or 
employee compensation. Therefore, for comparability, the World Bank incorporates all 
three items together (World Bank 2005b; see Reinke and Patterson 2005 for more 
detail). Since this is a cross-country comparative study, we use the dataset created by 
the World Bank, which also has the advantage that it has augmented the IMF data with 
estimates of remittances for countries with incomplete or missing data. The World Bank 
has also compiled figures per region and per income level, which is useful for a 
descriptive analysis of remittance flows worldwide.  
4.2 Financial  inclusion 
Until recently, measuring financial inclusion on a cross-country level meant using 
proxies that were arguably more reflective of financial development than financial 
inclusion (see, for example, Beck, Levine and Loayza 1999; Peachey and Roe 2004). 
The dataset from Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Martinez Peria (2005) introduces various 
indicators on the access to financial services, use of deposits and loans, average deposit 
and loan size and even predicted share of households with bank accounts. It provides a 
comprehensive country-level comparison for both developed and developing countries. 
To construct the predicted share of households with bank accounts, they use a smaller 
dataset from Claessens (2005) and Gasparini, Gutierrez and Porto (2005) on the share of 
households with bank accounts (Sba) and regress this on the log of deposit accounts per 
100,000 people and log of average deposit account size in USD. Since this specific 
measure gives a direct indication of the usage of formal savings and transaction services 
(and not just banking penetration or number of loans/deposits), this seems to be the best 
indicator to use for measuring the utilization of financial services, and is therefore 
applied here.  
Opting for this variable also determines the time dimension to be used. The timeframe is 
just one year per country, allowing for a cross-sectional analysis only. Most data points 
are from 2003, though the years of data collection range from 2001 to 2005.  
4.3 Measuring  other  variables 
We include all factors that Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Martinez Peria (2005) show as 
correlating with at least one proxy for financial access and/or use (see section 3). As 
mentioned, we also include income level (GDP per capita) to control for income effects 
that may influence access to finance. The indicators used to measure these variables are 
listed in the Appendix, where we also present descriptive statistics of the dependent and 
independent variables (Appendix Table A1). 
Since we are looking for a causal effect of remittance inflows on financial inclusion, a 
time lag is built into the analysis, by including statistics for each country on remittances 
for the year preceding the financial inclusion data. This way, if a relationship is found, it 
is less likely to flow in the opposite direction. Thus, data for financial inclusion stem 
from the years 2001-05 and for remittances from 2000-03 (data from 2004 are not yet 
available). To be comparable across countries, remittance flows are computed per 14 
capita, using population figures from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 
2005b).  
5 Regression  results 
In order to test the effect of remittance inflows on financial inclusion, we use the 
general to specific approach. We start with a model in which all independent variables 
are included. This model is specified as follows:  
FININCL = β1 + β2 (LOG) REMCAP + β3 GOVERN + β4 POPDENS + β5 LOG 
(GDP) + β6 GDPCAP + β7 COMINFR + β8 TRANSINFR + β9 CONCENTR + β10 
CREDITINFO + β11 SHAREGOV + β12 RESTRICT + β13 ENTRYREQ + et  
Abbreviations    
FININCL = predicted share of households with bank accounts;  
REMCAP = remittance inflow per capita; 
GOVERN = governance index; 
POPDENS = population density; 
GDP = gross domestic product; 
GDPCAP = GDP per capita; 
COMINFR = communication infrastructure; 
TRANSINFR = transportation infrastructure; 
CONCENTR = concentration ratio; 
CREDITINFO = credit information index; 
SHAREGOV = share of assets in government-owned banks; 
RESTRICT = restrictions on bank activities; and 
ENTRYREQ = requirements for entry into banking.  
Appendix Table A2 gives the definitions, sources and the year of observation for all 
variables. 
Next, we delete all insignificant variables one at a time, and end up with explanatory 
variables that have a significance level below 10 per cent. In order to examine the 
robustness of the outcomes, for the preferred equation we present also an estimate in 
which data for certain developed economies are included.  
A matter of concern may be the possible collinearity between the independent variables. 
Therefore, in Appendix Table A3, a correlation matrix for all independent variables is 
presented. This table shows that remittances per capita have no correlation with other 
variables higher than 0.27 (with population density). Looking at all the variables, none 
of the pairwise correlations is larger than 0.8, indicating that there are no potentially 
harmful collinear relationships. We also create an auxiliary regression with remittances 
per capita on the left-hand side and all the other independent variables on the right. The 
R
2 obtained is 0.28 (adjusted R
2 is -0.0075). We can therefore conclude that the 15 
variation in remittances per capita is not explained by variation in the other variables. 
Thus, collinearity does not have a harmfully effect  on the outcomes of the regressions.  
We use two estimation techniques. First, we apply the ordinary least squares estimation 
method. Second, since it is well-known that least squares estimation results may be very 
sensitive to some possible outliers especially for small samples, we also use the median  
 
Table 6 
Explaining the predicted share of households with bank accounts 
 1a  1b  2a  2b  3a  3b 





























      




      




      




      
















      
















      




      




      




      
           
N 22  22  37  37  47  47 
Adj R
2  0.28   0.51    0.80   
Pseudo R








Skewness -0.044    0.638    0.625   
Kurtosis 2.32    5.599    5.44   







Method  OLS  MED  OLS MED OLS  MED 
Note:    Figures in parentheses are p-values, based on White adjusted standard errors. Figures in 
brackets are standardized coefficients. Dependent variable is the predicted share of bank 
accounts (Sba). The sample for Equations 1 and 2 contains developing countries only. For 
Equation 3 we also added some (total of ten) developed economies for which data on the 
dependent and independent variables are available. OLS refers to the results from ordinary least 
squares regressions. MED refers to results from the quantile (median) regression technique.  16 
estimator. Median regressions are much more resistant to possible outliers. The median 
estimator essentially forms a part of the non-parametric quantile regression technique. 
This technique determines the coefficients by minimizing the sum of absolute 
deviations. More specifically, the median linear regression parameters are given by the 







yx yx yx ββ β
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−= −≥ − ∑∑ . All 
estimates are done with STATA. The regression results are given in Table 6. 
The table shows that in all cases, remittances have a significantly positive effect on 
financial inclusion. Including all potentially relevant variables, and estimating with 
OLS, remittances per capita become the only significant variable, at a 10 per cent level. 
When the median regression technique is used, remittances are significant at the 1 per 
cent level. Moreover, with this technique, all other variables appear to be significant as 
well. With a backward selection, remittances per capita enter significantly into the 
equation at a 1 per cent level, together with GDP at a 10 per cent level and the 
governance index at a 1 per cent level. The same results hold for the median regressor; 
now, however, GDP is no longer significant at the usual significance level.  
When certain developed countries are included, remittances still appear to have a 
positive significant effect on financial inclusion, both in the OLS and the median 
estimator. When looking at the significance of the models as a whole, all models have a 
significant F-value. The adjusted  R
2 varies between 0.28 and 0.8. The regression results 
also indicate that in some cases (see, for instance, Equation 2a) the residuals are not 
normally distributed, indicated by the values for the Kurtosis and skewness. In these 
cases, the median estimator may be more reliable. The Ramsey reset test suggests that 
the equations are correctly specified, and that the functional form of the models is 
appropriate. Overall, the regression results clearly show the relevance of remittances in 
explaining financial inclusion.  
5.1 Remittances,  financial  inclusion and economic growth 
Although examination of the remittances-financial inclusion/economic growth nexus is 
not the main objective of this paper, we end this section by presenting some new 
evidence on the topic. We assess the impact of remittances on the economic growth of 
developing countries by estimating a set of equations in which per capita economic 
growth and financial inclusion are the endogenous variables. The results are presented 
in Table 7.  
Table 7 clearly shows that financial inclusion positively affects per capita growth. In all 
regressions our indicator for financial inclusion has a positive and significant impact on 
growth. Moreover, also in this set of system regressions, remittances have a 
significantly positive effect on financial inclusion. We tried several other specifications 
of the growth equation, by also introducing remittances directly in the growth equation. 
However, in none of these specifications do the additional variables appear to be 
significant. For reasons of space, these regression results are not presented. Most 
importantly, the regressions given in Table 7 empirically confirm our main hypothesis 
that remittances stimulate financial inclusion and, through this channel, stimulate per 
capita growth.    
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Table 7 
Remittances, financial inclusion and per capita growth 
  1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b 
Dep.  var.  Grow Sba Grow Sba Grow Sba Grow Sba 






























































































           
N  35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
R
2  0.39 0.49 0.41 0.42 0.40 0.43 0.40 0.58 
Notes:   The sets of equations (1a and 1b; 2a and 2b; 3a and 3b) are estimated with three-stage least 
squares. P-values are  in parentheses. Grow refers to the average GDP per capita growth rate of 
the 1990-2003 period. Sba refers to the percentage share of bank accounts (financial inclusion). 
Lgdppc is the initial value (1990) of GDP per capita. Govc is government consumption over 
GDP; trade is net trade over GDP and Invgdp is investment over GDP. The last three variables 
refer to 1999 and are derived  from World Bank (2005b). 
6 Conclusions 
In this paper, we focus on the relationship between remittance inflows and financial 
inclusion in developing countries. We present single equation estimates on remittances 
and financial inclusion and system estimates in which economic growth is explained by, 
financial inclusion, for example, and financial inclusion by remittances inflows, for 
example. These regressions clearly confirm our main hypothesis that remittances have a 
development impact through their effect on financial inclusion.  
Overall, our paper indicates the importance of studying the effects of remittances in 
developing countries. Remittances in terms of size are not only one of the main capital 
inflows in developing countries—often even more substantial than ODA—but also 
seem to have a robust positive effect on economic growth. It is therefore surprising that 
empirical studies on remittances inflows lag behind, certainly when compared to the 
numerous studies dealing with the development impact of ODA. 18 
We realize that more research is needed for a conclusive answer on the development 
impact of remittances. A drawback of our study—as well as of all other studies 
available—is that remittances data are still very limited. Therefore, data on remittance 
flows need to be improved and a method of recording remittance at the international 
level to be developed. From an academic point of view, quality data on remittances are 
essential for providing good policy guidance. Only then can the effects of remittance 
flows (not just on financial inclusion) be investigated more accurately. Measurement of 
informal flows in particular should be researched further, as is already happening 
(Reinke and Patterson 2005; Freund and Spatafora 2005). It would be interesting to 
analyse further what factors affect the use of formal as opposed to informal channels, 
since flows through formal channels are more likely to impact financial inclusion in a 
positive way. Also, the measure of financial inclusion needs to be improved. Building 
on the dataset created by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Martinez Peria (2005), the next step 
could be to create variables that measure access to and usage of financial services across 
the board, not just with regard to deposits and loans. In addition, research could also be 
further improved by including other characteristics of the sending migrants into the 
analysis, such as income level since this is likely to play a role in the effect of 
remittances on financial usage. This would give better insight into the categories of 
migrants who are banking, who become banking individuals because of remittances, 
and who still do not use any formal financial services. Policy can then be focused on the 
groups who are yet to become banking individuals.  19 
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Appendix Table A1 
Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables 
 
All variables 
Predicted share of 
banking households  
Remittance 
inflow/capita at t-1 
Economic size  
(GDP) 
Average income level 






on bank activities 
             
Mean 0.2632  64.3109  96,500,000,000 2217.7130  -0.2227 0.6416  1.7917 
Median 0.2425  26.5304  18,200,000,000 1774.5740  -0.3503 0.6123  2.0000 
Maximum 0.7860  562.9053  1,420,000,000,000 6794.8640  1.2456 1.0000  4.0000 
Minimum 0.0010  0.1990  742,000,000 101.5248  -1.2112  0.2247  0.0000 
Std dev.  0.1993  105.7897  215,000,000,000 1849.7400  0.6016 0.1909  1.1291 
Skewness 0.6320  2.7632  4.31  1.0253 0.5736  0.2736  0.1476 
Kurtosis 2.7441  10.9877  24.52  3.1526 2.4648  2.3660  2.1732 
Jarque-Bera 2.6336  251.5869  1,433.22 11.2758  4.0736  1.7827  1.5414 
Probability 0.2680  0.0000  0.00  0.0036 0.1304  0.4101  0.4627 
Observations 38 64  64  64  61  61  48 
 
              
 
Communication infrastructure 
(telephone lines per capita) 
Transportation infrastructure 
(railways per km2) 
Population 
 density 





entry into banking  
            
Mean 0.1462  0.0173  116.7910 24.5957  3.1667  7.3617 
Median 0.1222  0.0081  72.2395 16.3000  3.5000  8.0000 
Maximum 0.4172  0.1229  1060.7000 80.000  6.0000  8.0000 
Minimum 0.0024  0.0000  3.0393 0.0000  0.0000  3.0000 
Std dev.  0.1102  0.0221  162.2590 24.5717  2.0433  0.9874 
Skewness 0.5388  2.6351  3.7558 0.7537 -0.3475  -2.1430 
Kurtosis 2.3671  11.4366 20.2196 2.2759  1.9326  9.1315 
Jarque-Bera 4.1645  239.1355  941.1710 5.3599  4.0558  109.5986 
Probability 0.1246  0.0000  0.0000 0.0686  0.1316  0.0000 




Appendix Table A2 
Definitions, sources and year of observation of all variables 
Variable Definition  Source Year 
      
Demographic branch 
penetration 
No. of bank branches per 
100,000 people 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt 







No. of branches per 1,000 km2 Ditto    Ditto 
Demographic ATM 
penetration 
No. of ATMS per 100,000 people  Ditto  Ditto 
Geographic ATM 
penetration 
No. of ATMS per 1,000 km2 Ditto  Ditto 
Loan accounts p.c.  Average loan size/GDP p.c.  Ditto  Ditto 
Loan-income ratio  No. of loans per 1,000 people  Ditto  Ditto 
Deposit accounts p.c.  Average deposit size/GDP p.c.  Ditto  Ditto 
Deposit income ratio  No. of deposits per 1,000 people  Ditto  Ditto 
Predicted household 
share with bank account
Calculated using data on share 
of households with bank 
accounts on the log of deposit 
accounts per 100,000 and the 
log of average deposit size 
(US$)  
Beck, Demirguç-Kunt 
and Martinez Peria 
(2005), with data from 
Claessens (2005) and 
Gasparini, Gutierrez and 
Porto (2005) 
Ditto 





WB (2005a) for 
remittances; WB 
(2005b) for developed 





Economic size  Gross domestic product  WB (2005b)  2003 
Average income level  GDP p.c. (constant 2000 US$)  WB (2005b)  2003 
Governance index  Average score of six governance 
indicators, where high score 
implies better governance 
Kaufman, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2005) 
2004 
Concentration ratio  Assets of three largest banks as 
a share of assets of all 
commercial banks in the 
system 
Fitch’s bankscope 
database in Beck, 
Demirgüç and Levine 
(1999) 
2003 
Credit information index  Scored on 0-6 scale, score 
increasing with availability of 
credit information 
Djankov, McLiesh and 
Shleifer (2004), adopted 






Restrictions on bank 
activities 
Sum of restrictions on banks 
owning real estate, insurance, 
securities and non-financial 
firms 




Entry requirements for 
banking 
No. of requirements for banking 
license 
Ditto 2001 
Share of assets in 
government-owned 
banks 
% of banking system assets in 









Railways per sq km2  WB (2005b)  2002 and 
2003 
Population density  Total population/total land area  WB (2005B)  2003 
Notes to Appendix Table A2 (next page) 25 
Notes to Appendix Table A2: Additional variables used in growth regressions: 
Grow:    GDP per capita growth rate between 1990-2003. Calculated from GDP per capita figures in 
constant 2000US$ (source: WB (2005b). 
Govc:   Government consumption over GDP, 1999 (source: WB 2005b). 
Invgdp:   Gross investment over GDP, 1999 (source: WB 2005b). 
Lgdp:   Ln GDP per capita of 1990 (source: WB 2005b). 
Trade:   Net Trade over GDP, 1999 (source: WB 2005b). 
 
 
Appendix Table A3 
Pairwise correlation coefficients between all independent variables 
 COMINFR  CONCENTR  CREDITINFO ENTRYREQ GDP  GDPCAP 
        
COMINFR 1.000000  -0.099790  0.219836 -0.040053  0.126198  0.731847 
CONCENTR -0.099790  1.000000  -0.221936 0.096412  -0.264003  -0.023732 
CREDITINFO 0.219836  -0.221936  1.000000 -0.066661  0.072580  0.452804 
ENTRYREQ -0.040053  0.096412  -0.066661 1.000000  -0.207876  -0.059795 
GDP 0.126198  -0.264003  0.072580 -0.207876  1.000000  0.043252 
GDPCAP 0.731847  -0.023732  0.452804 -0.059795  0.043252  1.000000 
GOVERN  0.540971 0.076189 0.425651  -0.183370 -0.013865  0.765663 
POPDENS  -0.106434 -0.177748 -0.136680 -0.220983  0.018302 -0.053917 
REMCAP  0.111719 0.058276 0.024737 0.151785  -0.149840 0.181374 
RESTRICT -0.097490 0.002701  -0.057729 -0.092019  0.287350 -0.231934 
SHAREGOV 0.014680 -0.204817 -0.199169 -0.183069  0.425331 -0.176688 
TRANSINFR 0.621847 -0.038677  0.032291 0.019170  -0.051169 0.537903 
 
 GOVERN  POPDENS  REMCAP  RESTRICT  SHAREGOV  TRANSINFR
       
COMINFR 0.540971  -0.106434  0.111719 -0.097490  0.014680  0.621847 
CONCENTR 0.076189 -0.177748 0.058276 0.002701  -0.204817  -0.038677 
CREDITINFO 0.425651  -0.136680  0.024737 -0.057729 -0.199169  0.032291 
ENTRYREQ -0.183370  -0.220983  0.151785 -0.092019 -0.183069  0.019170 
GDP -0.013865  0.018302  -0.149840 0.287350 0.425331  -0.051169 
GDPCAP 0.765663  -0.053917  0.181374 -0.231934 -0.176688  0.537903 
GOVERN 1.000000  -0.111593  -0.011880 -0.156725 -0.219176  0.382951 
POPDENS -0.111593 1.000000 0.267179 0.214463 0.202532 0.144333 
REMCAP -0.011880  0.267179  1.000000 0.068121  -0.185363 0.113073 
RESTRICT -0.156725 0.214463 0.068121 1.000000 0.252075  -0.091206 
SHAREGOV -0.219176  0.202532  -0.185363 0.252075 1.000000 0.071678 
TRANSINFR 0.382951  0.144333  0.113073 -0.091206  0.071678  1.000000 
Abbreviations: Same as in equation 1 
 
 